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Note No.91 Regulating Water Concessions
Lessons from the Buenos Aires concession
Claude Crampes The public water and sewerage services for meters of underground tunnels, 9 pumping sta-
and Antonio Greater Buenos Aires were privatized under a tions, 2 treatment stations, 370 kilometers of wa-
Estache concession contract three years ago. Already, ter mains, and 19,000 kilometers of distribution
there are positive results. Labor productivity pipes. Poor maintenance of the system had led
has almost tripled, service coverage has in- to significant water losses-probably about 40
creased, reliability and responsiveness have percent, although no one really cared about
improved, and the price of service has fallen. measuring them then. OSN produced 3.7 mil-
But there are also some teething problems, es- lion cubic meters of water a day and served
pecially in regulation. This Note discusses les- about 6 million inhabitants, about 70 percent of
sons for policymakers contemplating a similar the area's population. Coverage for sewerage
approach to water sector reform. was even lower, at about 58 percent.
Strategy To avoid a prolonged process of privatization,
the government opted to award the right to pro-
Argentina privatized the water and sewerage ser- vide service under a concession rather than sell
vices in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area in the utility, thus keeping the fixed assets under
1993. The assets of the public enterprise, Obras public ownership. Selling the assets would have
Sanitarias de la Naci6n (OSN), included 77 kilo- required overcoming legislative hurdles, and the
government feared that assessing the value of
the underground pipes would be costly and time
consuming. The government also decided not
TABLE I IMPACT OF THE GREATER BUENOS AIRES to break up the utility. A single private firm
WATER CONCESSION would operate the services for thirty years, a
reasonable period in which to finance and com-
Change from May 1993 plete the required investments. The concession
hIdicator to Decemnber 1995 could be extended for one year, but at the end
__ __ __ __ __ __  of the term, a new bid would be organized.
increase in production capacity (pement) 26 The main objective of the reform was to reduce
Water pipes rehabilitated (kilometers) 550( the cost to the government of operating the ser-
Sewers drained (kiloneters) 4 800: vices while minimizing the price for service de-
Decline in clogged drains (percent) 97 livery. Bidders would compete to provide services
Meters upgraded and instaled f28,50D at the lowest price (the largest discount to the
Staff reduction (percent) 47 public tariffs). No cash payments would be re-
Residents witit new water comnectionts 64Z=quired. But the winning bidder, as the conces-
Resident withtew sewer cwJnecfions 342,00D sionaire, would assume responsibility for
Residents with new sewer connections 342,0operating and maintaining the fixed assets and
would be obligated to expand coverage, guaran-
tee water quality, and develop sewage treatment.
The targets for coverage imply investments of






















































about US$4 billion over the life of the contract, Competition
with a large share to be disbursed at the begin-
ning of the concession period. Pricing would be Water distribution and sewage collection are natu-
governed by general tariff principles set out in ral monopolies, so the scope for direct market
the concession contract, maintaining the cross- competition is lirnited to minor activities, such as
subsidies that existed under public provision. The billing and revenue collection. In the Buenos Aires
first price review would occur after five years. concession, competition was introduced through
There would be some possibility for renegotiat- the bidding process. This process, which plays a
ing the rules in the case of an unenforceable event critical role in drawing out enough information
or new information, but any change would have to ensure that a concession is awarded success-
to maintain the implicit rate of return proposed fully, generally worked well.
by the winning bidder (that is, maintain consis-
tency between the timing of costs and the evolu- The rules required potential bidders to prequalify
tion of tariffs). The concessionaire would also be to limit the bidding to firms with strong technical
responsible for negotiating the private labor con- and financial capabilities and to ensure that any
tracts with the labor unions (since all workers foreign bidders would be the very top operators.
ended up "privatized"). The call for bids went out in June 1992, request-
ing two envelopes. The first, which determined
Impact and lessons whether a bidder qualified, held technical offers
(including legal features of the bidder, a mission
The impact of the concession strategy has been statement, operational plans, proposed regula-
generally positive (table 1). Since May 1993, the tions for users, and a US$3 million guarantee of
first month of private operation, the maintenance commitment to the offer). The second envelope,
system has been revamped and the backlog of opened if a bidder qualified, held financial and
repairs significantly reduced. Rehabilitation has economic offers, including adjustments to the
cut water losses to about 25 percent, according current tariff rate, indicators of financial strength
to estimates by the concessionaire, allowing cov- and commitment, and an explanation of how the
erage to increase by 10 percent with no increase bidder would operate with the new tariff. The
in production. Coverage for sewerage services contract would go to the bidder offering the larg-
is up about 8 percent. And prices were initially est discount to the public tariffs. The rest of the
reduced by 27 percent. While they rose last year, information to be provided was essentially in-
they are still 17 percent lower than those charged tended to demonstrate that the discount proposed
by the public utility. would allow revenues consistent with the level
and timing of expenditure commitments.
But not all has been smooth sailing. Negotia-
tions with the unions, for example, have been The concession contract was awarded in De-
tense, though first impressions suggest a suc- cember 1992 (transfer occurred in May 1993) to
cessful outcome. Most direct indicators of la- Aguas Argentinas, a consortium headed by
bor productivity show dramatic improvements. Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez that offered a tariff
And after a 48 percent reduction in staff in the discount of 26.9 percent. This result suggests
first year of operation, the concessionaire is that the competition for the market has been
now recruiting to keep up with the demand effective in reducing costs to users. To sustain
for services. But indirect labor costs remain this gain, the national government is considering
high, comparable to what they were under pub- yardstick competition when the price review
lic management, as the concessionaire contin- comes due-possible now that some of the pro-
ues to provide many of the fringe benefits vincial services have also been privatized un-
traditionally available to civil servants (total la- der concessions. Yardstick competition is used
bor costs are still about 60 percent of operat- effectively in the United Kingdom, where the
ing costs). The most difficult adjustments, regulator calculates and widely publicizes wa-
however, have been in the regulatory area. ter companies' comparative efficiency.
Government as regulator rather than they need to recruit international experts-as
service provider they did recently to assess a request by the
concessionaire for an adjustment in the con-
A key to the success of the bidding process has tractual investment plan.
been its transparency. Just as important is trans-
parency in the concession contract-clear and Adjustments and renegotiation
unambiguous assignment and enforcement of
the rights and obligations of the concessionaire. Soon after the concession had been awarded,
The main regulatory instrument, this contract water quality problems revealed that the infra-
spells out the rules of the game for the private structure was in worse shape than the govern-
monopoly. But for the privatization to be effec- ment and the concessionaire had estimated. So
tive, the Argentine government has had to rec- in June 1994, they agreed to speed up the deliv-
ognize that once a private operator takes over, ery of some service requirements. The resulting
it is in charge within the terms of the contract. cost increases triggered a contract clause (over
That does not mean that the government has 7 percent) allowing an increase in tariffs, and
no role. Because competition is limited to the Aguas Argentinas was granted a 13.5 percent tar-
initial bidding and the rebidding at the end of iff hike. There was much public confusion about
the concession (crucial to the effectiveness of this increase, and many users felt that it was un-
the initial bidding), the government has a criti- fair. Poor explanation of the approval process to
cal role to play as a regulator. But this is not a the users was partly to blame for this perception.
day-to-day management role. Some argue that
the level of detail in the Buenos Aires conces- This experience reinforces the need for rules
sion contract reveals reluctance by the govern- allowing adjustment in the terms of conces-
ment to give up management of the service and sion contracts when new information becomes
that the contract focuses too much on processes available or circumstances change. It also shows
and detailed targets. There may be some truth the need for regulators to ensure that the pub-
in this, but it also reflects the lack of data at the lic understands their decisions and perceives
time of bidding. Also true, however, is that pri- them as independent. This requires transpar-
vate monopolies will try to keep regulators at a ency both in analysis and in decisionmaking.
distance to make the most of their monopoly Although the concession contract should be
power. The challenge is to design a contract prepared as if it were not going to change,
that achieves the right balance. This requires under specific, limited circumstances, some
good data, which can take time to collect. flexibility may be good policy. To ensure that
the contract is a credible regulatory instrument,
The government's new regulatory role is in the modifications should be arrived at through fair
hands of a newly created independent regula- and workable renegotiation rules based on
tory agency, Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios clear, preestablished criteria and agreed to by
Sanitarios (ETOSS). The agency is financed by all parties. Fortunately, the Aguas Argentinas
a user fee levied on consumers and governed contract included such a rule.
by a directorate appointed to a six-year term,
with the option of one renewable term. It moni- The challenge for policymakers is to find a
tors the concessionaire, enforces the conces- transparent mechanism for modifying the terms
sion contract and regulatory decisions, and of the contract without undermining investor
levies fines when necessary. This new role may or consumer confidence. A renegotiation rule
be the most difficult fact to accept for the newly should expose what changed unexpectedly. For
created regulatory agency, as many of the example, if the assets deteriorated between the
agency's employees had worked for the pub- time the bids were made and the transfer of
lic water utility. Most recognize that they need the assets, what was the cause? Was it the
new skills to be effective regulators and that weather? Or did the public operators stop main-
when they lack the skills for a particular task, taining the assets? If the first, responsibility
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might be shared between the government and creates a complex system of cross-subsidies
the concessionaire. If the second, the conces- between water and sewerage services. Although
sionaire might have a fair claim for revising the water and sewerage charges are higher than
the contract. The public policy criteria for test- operating costs, they do not fully cover invest-
ing whether revision is needed must be pre- ment costs. The contract allows the conces-
established and clearly defined. And any sionaire to use revenues from existing clients
change to the contract that is warranted should to cover water system expansion costs not cov-
be limited to the issue at hand: the entire con- ered by new customers.
tract should not be renegotiated. Of course,
unilateral modification of the rights defined in Conclusion
the contract or the bidding documents-say,
through a request to accelerate investment or As Argentina is finding out, regulating a private
a move to impede tariff adjustments, without monopoly can be challenging. Its experience
full compensation-is tantamount to expropria- suggests that to maximize the gains from water
tion and defeats the purpose of reform. privatization, reformers in other countries should
make the most of competition for the market,
Investment and tariffs make sure that the government is comfortable
with shifting its role from service provider to
The design of the tariff formula is at the core of regulator, anticipate needs for renegotiating or
effective regulation and critical to the sustain- adjusting the terms of the contract, and not un-
The Note series is an ability of the reforms. The regulatory regime rec- derestimate the problems of tariff design.
open forum intended to
encourage dissemina- ognizes legitimate costs and allows an additional
tion of and debate on profit margin (a loose form of cost-plus regula- The Argentine regulators, to their credit, are
ideas, innovations, and tion, as information on cost is very approximate). aware of the tariff design problems and are deal-
best practices for
expanding the private There are about four different kinds of tariff ing with them systematically. For example, they
sector. The views structures. Which structure is applied depends are commissioning a tariff study (from an inter-
published are those of on the kind of building involved, and how the national consulting company) that should lead
the authors and should
not be attributed to the tariff is charged depends on whether the con- to marginal cost pricing and to a new tariff based
World Bank or any of its sumer is metered. The design of this family of on metering. With the benefit of hindsight, many
affiliated organizations. tariffs introduces a number of distortions. First, in the government may regret not having com-
Nor do any of the con-
clusions represent the metering incentive is in the wrong direc- missioned the study much earlier, when the sec-
official policy of the tion. Consumers have an incentive to install a tor was being restructured. That would have
World Bank or of its meter only if their consumption is small, but prevented the delay in implementing efficient
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or the countries they without meters it is difficult for the concession- and equitable tariff principles-and many of the
represent. aire to track water losses. Second, average prices disagreements that have arisen among users,
are lower for large users than for small users, providers, and regulators since May 1993.
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